Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan
An Interagency Assessment

Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction, Department of State
Joint Center for Operational Analysis/United States Joint Forces Command
Bureau of Policy and Program Coordination, United States Agency for International Development

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Team Members:

United States Agency for International Development
Sharon Morris
James (Spyke) Stephenson
Joint Center for Operational Analysis, USJFCOM
COL Paul Ciminelli, USA,
Donald Muncy
Department of State
Tod Wilson
Al Nugent

(The views expressed by the USAID team are those of the individual participants and should not be attributed to their sponsoring agency.)

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Acronyms

ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
ACM	Anti-coalition Militia
AO	Area of Operations
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
CERP	Commanders Emergency Response Program Fund
CFC-A	Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CJTF-76	Combined Joint Task Force-76
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Program
CRDA	Community Revitalization and Development Activity
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DIAG	Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups Program
DfID	Department for International Development, UK Government
DOD	United States Department of Defense
DOS	United States Department of State
FOB	Forward Operating Base
GOA	Government of Afghanistan
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JFCOM/JCOA	United States Joint Forces Command/Joint Center for Operational Analysis
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPP	Mission Performance Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ODHACA	Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
QIP	Quick Impact Program
RAMP	Rural Agriculture Marketing Program
UN	United Nations
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USG	United States Government
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services

Executive Summary

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been an effective tool for stabilization in Afghanistan. They have strengthened provincial and district level institutions and empowered local leaders who support the central government. In many locations PRTs have helped set the conditions where increased political, social, and economic development is possible. However, three years into implementation and with transitions to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) accelerating, the application of lessons learned is appropriate and important to United States government (USG) national objectives.

Over the past three years the operational center of gravity for security, reconstruction, and governance has been slowly shifting away from Kabul to Afghanistan's provinces. National programs are adjusting to this shift, but their geographic reach is limited in many of Afghanistan's dangerous and remote areas. This means that PRTs will continue to be one of the primary vehicles for USG and international stabilization efforts and could play an even more important role, particularly in the unstable south and southeast regions.

After three years, the challenges and opportunities of the PRT model are better understood. With PRT transitions to ISAF accelerating, the assessment and dissemination of lessons learned is appropriate and important to USG objectives. The issues and recommendations below capture key lessons that can serve to improve effectiveness of PRTs and meet future stabilization challenges.

Civil Military Coordination

- The US interagency community should develop guidance that clearly outlines the mission, roles, responsibilities, and authorities of each participating department or agency within the PRT.

- The Embassy and Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A) need to reinvigorate an in-country interagency coordinating body that articulates how national programs and PRT efforts fit into broader US foreign policy objectives.

- Guidance must be strengthened to direct US PRT commanders to incorporate non-DOD representatives into PRT strategy development and decision-making, or PRTs will fall short of its goals.

- In order to fill key US PRT positions, civilian agencies need to further develop policies and incentive structures to better achieve assignment objectives. In the short term, funding should be provided USAID for more direct-hire staff. Military and civilian personnel tour lengths should be aligned to ensure team development. Additionally, personnel must also have appropriate experience and training for PRT duties.

- US PRT management and information systems that support civilian representatives need to be strengthened.

- US PRT access to funds and capabilities needs to be improved to support the operational center of gravity (COG) movement to the provinces.

    - USAID needs to re-compete the Quick Impact Project (QIP) funding mechanism in order to draw in implementing partners who are able to operate more effectively in unstable provinces.

    - USDA representatives need access to dedicated funding. Additionally, any civilian agencies that place representatives on PRTs in the future should have access to dedicated funding.

- The USG needs to develop team training for all PRT personnel.

Transition to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Authority

- ISAF, the USG, and the government of Afghanistan (GOA) need to have a common, accepted political vision and strategy for PRTs transitioning in the South and Southeast regions.

- As ISAF PRT control moves to more volatile areas, NATO and lead nations need to continuously review available combat power and reach back capabilities to compensate for lead nation implementation restraints.

- Improved security requires a combination of political, economic, and military efforts. As the list of participating countries in ISAF PRTs expands, NATO and lead nations need to ensure that each PRT is fully resourced to conduct all essential tasks necessary to achieve GoA and NATO objectives.

- As more Coalition PRTs transition to ISAF control, the US should ensure that a minimum level of US staff and funding remains in place to enable continuity of operations and a smooth transition.

Extending the PRT Concept to other Peace and Stability Operations

- PRTs are most appropriate in a mid-range of violence where instability still precludes heavy nongovernmental organization (NGO) involvement, but where violence is not so acute that combat operations predominate. If PRTs are used outside this range, the model needs to be changed.

- To operate in a broad range of environmental contexts, PRT security measures need to be periodically reviewed and adapted to local conditions.

- If PRTs are replicated in other countries, their initial focus should be on mapping causes of conflict and developing targeted programs in order to understand and respond to conditions underlying instability.

- PRT assets and funding must be tailored to meet specific requirements. In adapting to different cultural and security contexts, PRT representatives need specialized sets of skills other than those held by many military and civilian officers.

I. Introduction

By the fall of 2005, Afghanistan had reached a critical transition point. In many parts of the country broad-based support for the national government existed. Recent elections for Afghanistan's National Assembly and Provincial Councils unfolded with very little violence, and for the first time, Afghans elected representatives at the local level.

Despite these successes, corruption and continuing violence in the provinces was and continues to threaten and undermine the legitimacy of the national government and reverse gains made to date. As the operational center of gravity for security, reconstruction, and governance shifted to Afghanistan's provinces, national programs are beginning to adjust to this shift, but their geographic reach is still limited. PRTs will continue to be one of the primary vehicles for USG and international stabilization efforts outside of Kabul, particularly in the unstable south and southeast.

Three years into the PRT experience, it is time to start gathering lessons about what works and what needs improvement in the implementation of the PRT model. This is particularly relevant as the United States begins to replicate the model in Iraq and as NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) begins to take on increasing responsibility for PRTs in many parts of Afghanistan.

In October 2005 a team from the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State (DOS), and the United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JFCOM/JCOA) assessed PRT operations in Afghanistan as part of an effort to distill best practices. The goals of the assessment were to:

- Generate lessons to inform greater cooperation and coordination between different USG departments and agencies in conflict and post-conflict settings.
- Determine key lessons to inform the transition of PRTs to ISAF.
- Analyze the PRT concept and various implementation approaches to determine their applicability to other current and future US peace and stability operations.

Before traveling to Afghanistan, the team conducted interviews with key officials and others who had recent experience in Afghanistan. During the three-week in-country phase of the assessment, members of the team interviewed over one hundred officials at the US Embassy, USAID, USDA, CFC-A, CJTF-76, ISAF, United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), GOA, international donors, and NGOs.

The team visited PRTs in Gardez, Ghazni, Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif, as well as Regional Command South and battalion task forces in Ghazni and Paktika. The team

met with most State, USAID, and USDA PRT representatives during a two-day Embassy-sponsored conference in Kabul and was able to meet with a broad range of military officials at the CJTF-76 PRT Commanders conference at Bagram Airfield.

All interviews were conducted on a non-attribution basis. A list of assessment questions is attached in Appendix A and a full list of interviewees is attached in Appendix B.

II. Background

PRTs, established in Afghanistan at the end of 2002 were integrated civilian-military organizations designed to meet three objectives: [1]

- To improve security,
- To extend the reach of the Afghan government, and
- To facilitate reconstruction in priority provinces.

In keeping with the overall policy environment at the time, the central focus was on maintaining a light international security "footprint" and on building the capacity of Afghan institutions to address instability in remote, ungoverned regions of the country.

When the assessment was conducted, twenty-two PRTs were operating in Afghanistan (see map in figure 1). Thirteen were managed by the U.S. led Combined Forces Command, Afghanistan and the remaining nine were under the auspices of ISAF.

Initial guidance on the structure and functions of US-led PRTs was agreed to by senior civilian and military leadership in Afghanistan and approved by the US Deputies Committee in June 2003. The guidance envisioned that civilian representatives and military officers in the PRT would work as a team to assess the environment and develop strategies to achieve their three primary objectives.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) was assigned responsibility for improving security in their area of operation, all logistical support, and providing force protection for all PRT members, including civilians. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) was given the lead on reconstruction and the Department of State (DOS) was responsible for political oversight, coordination, and reporting. All

[1] . US PRTs consist of between 50 to 100 personnel. A small number are U.S. civilians, generally a DOS representative, a USAID representative, and a representative from USDA. There is usually an Afghan representative from the Ministry of Interior. Not all PRTs have a full civilian complement. On the military side, there is a PRT commander, two civil affairs teams (with four members each), operational and administrative staff, and force protection elements (see Annex C).

members of the PRT leadership structure – military and civilian – were required to approve reconstruction projects and to coordinate with local government offices and national ministries. The concept anticipated that as PRTs matured and conditions changed, additional capacity would be available through reach-back to additional military and civilian assets.

Figure 1

Beyond this basic guidance, the essential tasks of the PRT were left open to allow the flexibility to adapt to local conditions. This flexibility became a “double-edged sword”. On one side, it recognized that there would be no “cookie-cutter” approach to Afghanistan’s diverse regions. Each PRT was expected to address the most important issues in its area of responsibility, and many did so with remarkable creativity and success.

In Gardez, for example, the USAID representative supported the work of the Tribal Liaison Office, an Afghan NGO dedicated to enabling dialogue between powerful tribes in unstable areas and the new central government. Building on this work, the Gardez PRT and UNAMA sponsored a provincial reconstruction workshop that brought together 100 tribal elders, local government officials, and representatives from Kabul to discuss national reconstruction plans.

Similarly, in Jalalabad, the PRT commander held regular meetings with religious leaders, university students, and tribal elders. After riots in May 2005 over alleged

US disrespect for the Koran, these meetings served as a forum to discuss local concerns. To demonstrate that the US was not opposed to Islam, the PRT commander helped refurbish the city's main mosque.

The downside of this flexibility was confusion, particularly in the NGO and international donor community, about what a PRT is, what it ought to do, and what its limits should be. People who served with NGOs argued that PRT activities, particularly in the areas of governance and reconstruction, could be counterproductive.

For example, in the start up phase some PRTs constructed schools and clinics, without paying enough attention to whether the Afghan government could afford to equip them with teachers, books, doctors, or medical supplies. While many PRTs have taken steps to redress this issue, there are still concerns within the NGO and donor community about the nature and scope of PRT programs to include maintaining humanitarian space from the PRT.

Another cost of the flexibility is the risk of focusing on local vice national objectives. For example, if the Ministry of Education is trying to establish national standards, and the PRTs have local approaches to that issue, it undermines what the Ministry is trying to accomplish.

III. Assessment Findings

There have been several previous studies of the PRT model (see Bibliography). This assessment differs in that it is an interagency assessment, reflecting input of evaluators from DOS, USAID and JFCOM/JCOA.

Broadly, this assessment supports the conclusion that the PRT can be an effective political-military tool in the strategy to stabilize Afghanistan's remote provinces. PRTs helped extend the authority of the central government by providing technical and organizational support to governors and provincial ministries. PRTs also delivered reconstruction and humanitarian assistance in remote, violent areas where no other development actors have been able or willing to operate. They also made significant contributions to security through their presence, and through support to the Afghan National Police and Army, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program, and the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) program.

Even so, not all PRTs have lived up to their full potential. As the US transfers PRT responsibilities to other nations and alliances, and as it extends the model into Iraq, it is critical that the interagency community understand both the strengths and weaknesses of PRTs as a tool to meet USG objectives.

The assessment findings are grouped under three central themes of civil-military coordination, transition to ISAF authority, and extensions of the concept to other peace and stability operations.

Civil Military Coordination

1. **The lack of explicit guidance led to confusion about civilian and military roles in the US-led PRT.** Without a shared understanding of respective roles and responsibilities, individual experience, skills, leadership style, and personality played a disproportionate role in determining the direction of PRT activities. In places where PRT commanders worked closely with the civilian and military members, the PRT developed as a team with a common vision and sense of aligned purpose. Where this was not the case, project implementation tended to be ad hoc and driven by response to higher headquarters vice local dynamics.

2. **The military commander of the US-led PRT needed to proactively incorporate non-DOD representatives into PRT leadership decisions or the goals of the PRT suffered.** While interagency guidance gave civilians from USAID and State the lead on governance and reconstruction, PRT culture, people, and resources were predominantly military. Dominance of the military was reinforced by force protection and security concerns and by the co-location of several coalition PRTs with maneuver units. Moreover, subordination of PRTs to maneuver units threatened to dilute a core focus of the PRT, which was to strengthen the Afghan government's capacity to address issues underlying instability and support for insurgency.

3. **A shortage of staff, limited technical and managerial support from Kabul, and inadequate mechanisms for project implementation undermined effectiveness of the US-led PRTs.** Military officers and civilian officials both stressed that if civilians were to lead on reconstruction and governance, they needed the resources, skill sets and authority necessary to take on their roles as outlined in the 2003 Deputies approved guidance. Lack of a strong mechanism to support both military and civilian reach-back for subject matter experts hindered the US-led PRTs ability to meet the changing needs of their area of operations.

4. **As the operational center of gravity for reconstruction and governance shifted to the provinces, USG supporting programs did not keep pace.** Many national level programs that existed in the provinces were poorly coordinated with US-led PRTs. Lack of coordination limited the ability of the US-led PRT to align these programs to support the broader stabilization and reconstruction strategy. Additionally, nationally implemented donor programs had limited geographic reach.

5. **Combined team training for military and civilian staff proved essential.** US-led PRTs were formed in theater and tours were not synchronized, often leading

to a lack of civil-military coordination and standard operating procedures. This stood in sharp contrast to some ISAF PRTs that assembled and trained extensively prior to deployment.

Transition to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Authority

6. **A common vision of PRT organization, roles and mission was needed to enable the PRT to reach its potential.** PRTs have an intrinsic political-military role in support of the Afghan national government. In the future, ISAF, lead nations and the GOA need to develop a common vision and strategy to ensure ISAF PRTs meet the political-military objectives approved by the GoA and NATO and reinforced by the PRT Executive Steering Committee.

7. **Review of PRT effectiveness demonstrated that, as ISAF lead nations move into more volatile areas, continuous examination of available combat power and reach-back capabilities must be conducted to compensate for changes in lead nation implementing restraints.** In southern and eastern regions, the risk of insurgent activity is higher, demanding a flexible and representative PRT response mechanism to increased hostile combat capabilities and counter offensive operations against PRTs. Additionally, lead nation restraints that limit operations and implementation of their activities could significantly reduce their effectiveness in a more volatile security environment.

8. **Security in unstable provinces was improved by a combination of political, economic, and military efforts.** PRTs, either alone or in coordination with other organizations in the province, needed to implement a full array of security, governance, and reconstruction initiatives, tailored to the local dynamics.

9. **Continuity of effort proved critical to success.** A seamless handover of projects and information was needed to maintain credibility when handing authority from a US-led PRT to the Coalition or ISAF. Coordination for the remaining US Staff, their PRT duties and inter-relationships with the incoming PRT leaders and lead nation responsibilities for the US staff, needed to be formalized prior to transition.

Extending the PRT Concept to other Peace and Stability Operations

10. **PRTs were most successful within a limited range of security challenges.** The teams proved most effective when instability precluded heavy NGO involvement in reconstruction, but violence was not so acute that combat operations predominated.

11. **Resources provided to PRTs needed to be tailored to local dynamics to provide the greatest chance of success.** Both military and civilian chains of command provided standard packages of resources for each PRT, but a "one size fits all" approach did not meet unique challenges and opportunities in Afghanistan's diverse provinces. Reach-back for specific skills and capacity were extremely limited.

12. **PRTs proved most effective when they devoted attention to understanding and responding to issues underlying instability and support for insurgency.** Many security incidents were related to tribal competition over land, the narcotics trade, revenge killings, or violence between nomadic and sedentary populations.

IV. Assessment Recommendations

Despite challenges in implementation, PRTs have played an important role in stabilizing Afghanistan's remote provinces over the past three years. The following section presents a series of recommendations that would strengthen PRT performance. These recommendations are intended to serve as a starting point for discussion on how to increase the effectiveness of the PRT model.

A. Civil-Military Coordination

The integration of the security provided by military forces with projects intended to build infrastructure and strengthen the role of the national Afghan government proved one of the key advantages of the PRT model. Civilian representatives and military officers, working together with local partners, extended stabilizing influences into a wide-ranging area. But there were inevitable tensions within the PRT. These tensions were exacerbated by: 1) a lack of operational guidance clearly delineating missions, roles, responsibilities, and authorities; 2), a lack of understanding of the importance of incorporating non-DOD representatives into strategy development and decision-making; 3) the lack of adequate team training; and, 4) difficulties in providing adequate staff and resources.

1. The US interagency community should develop guidance that clearly outlines the mission, roles, responsibilities, and authorities of each participating department or agency within the PRT.

Military and civilian representatives needed to act in partnership to achieve the full potential of the PRT. In practice, this was a challenge. While initial guidance placed civilians in the decision-making lead on reconstruction and governance issues, many military officers viewed civilians in an advisory capacity and believed the commander had final authority over all PRT activities, especially when security challenges

seemed paramount. Very few PRT staff, civilian or military, understood or had seen US national policy guidance on their roles within the PRT.

In the absence of broadly accepted guidance, the importance of personality, individual leadership style, and previously established relationships had inordinate influence on the effectiveness and impact of the PRT. In places where PRT commanders worked closely with the civilian and military team members, the PRT developed as a team with a common vision and sense of aligned purpose. In other cases, the PRT effort was fragmented.

An example of this occurred in the spring of 2005 when CJTF-76 decided to consolidate operating bases in Paktika, giving twenty-four hours notice to the PRT that it had to move to the Forward Operating Base (FOB). Neither USAID nor the Embassy had been notified or consulted prior to this decision.

After USAID and the Embassy were consulted, the decision was made to move the maneuver element to the PRT rather than the PRT to the maneuver element. This left the PRT closer to the city. After the move, the maneuver commander was given operational control over the PRT.

Because the maneuver commander had a very clear understanding of the importance of reconstruction and political engagement, the move did not negatively affect the accomplishment of PRT objectives. But the positive outcome was based on the commander's experience and understanding of the overall mission, not interagency guidance on roles and responsibilities.

2. The Embassy and CFC-A need to reinvigorate an in-country interagency coordinating body that articulates how national programs and PRT efforts fit into broader US foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan.

Both US-led PRTs and national programs needed to work in concert to achieve US foreign policy goals. The Embassy's Mission Performance Plan (MPP) envisioned an increasing role for the PRT. However, there was no written plan to direct the implementation of this vision. USAID's Strategic Plan mentioned the PRTs only in passing and in an annex. Neither plan discussed how national programs and PRT activities complement one another.

There were successes, but the coordination was ad hoc. In Ghazni, for example, the DOS and USAID representatives discovered (by chance) that several heretofore-unknown US military and civilian programs were beginning to work on justice sector reform in Wardak province. The civilian representatives and PRT commander took the initiative to coordinate these national programs in collaboration with local officials. This resulted in a unified justice sector initiative for the Wardak province.

3. Guidance must direct PRT commanders to incorporate non-DOD representatives into PRT decision-making.

While interagency guidance gave civilians from USAID and State the lead on governance and reconstruction, the predominance of PRT culture, people, and resources was military. Dominance of the military was reinforced when security concerns reigned and when PRTs were co-located with maneuver units. However, subordination of PRTs to maneuver units threatened to dilute a core focus of the PRT, which was to strengthen the Afghan government's capacity to address issues underlying instability and support for insurgency.

Occasionally the maneuver commander assumed the role of leading the political—as well as the military—effort even when civilian representatives were present. In one case, the maneuver commander arranged to take a newly appointed governor to meet officials and constituents in remote districts. The State Department representative was not included in these meetings, despite a request to participate.

As one civilian explained, "When kinetic operations are necessary, we become an extension of the Forward Operating Base, [but] when the environment permits, we can do what was envisaged."

The PRT concept envisioned a combined military and civilian project development and approval process. Even though DOD, DOS, USAID, and USDA each had their own objectives, it was expected that these would merge through collaboration and consensus. In some PRTs, however, this did not happen, even after CFC-A issued guidance concerning project development and approval in early 2005 and USAID placed representatives at CJTF 76 and the Regional Commands to facilitate coordination at all levels of command.[2]

In the best PRTs, a working group met regularly to refine the PRT reconstruction strategy and approve and designate funding for all PRT projects. This approach should be expanded to all PRTs.

4. In order to fill key US PRT positions civilian agencies need to further develop policies and build more incentive structures to better achieve assignment objectives. In the short term, funding should be provided USAID for more direct-hire staff. Both military and civilian personnel tour lengths should be aligned to ensure team development. Additionally, military personnel must also have appropriate experience and training for PRT duties.

[2] This guidance directed that the use of Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds needed to be coordinated with USAID

There needs be a commitment to appropriately staff the PRTs. Given the importance of PRTs in the USG strategy for Afghanistan, PRT commanders need broad operational experience, appropriate past assignments, and service school training.[3]

Civilian personnel assigned to PRTs need to be capable of making key assessments, refining analysis, and implementing response activities. Early in the PRT implementation, desired skill sets for personnel could include short-term stabilization and conflict mitigation experience. Subsequent staffing might well focus on personnel with expertise in the development of basic infrastructure for security sector reform and local governance.

Additionally, civilian agencies must do more to find senior staff for PRT positions. Because of staff shortages, DOS, USAID, and USDA were generally able to put only one representative on each PRT or regional command. In the start-up phase, many civilian slots remained vacant. Where this occurred, the military took the lead in reconstruction and political engagement by default. While USAID, DOS and USDA were able to eventually staff most positions, many civilian representatives lacked the experience to function as leaders on the PRT or were short-term volunteers.

Military and civilian representatives were doing extraordinary work under very difficult conditions. They were smart, energetic, and dedicated. However, junior or non-direct hire staff civilian representatives often lacked experience with and knowledge of their own agencies. By comparison, most of their military counterparts had 16 to 20 years of experience prior to PRT command. There are significant limits to what civilian agencies can do to address this issue given current funding and staffing levels. Both State and USAID are taking steps to attract more senior, direct-hire staff. However, civilian agencies must determine what priority they will give PRT assignments given the responsibilities and the importance of PRTs in the USG strategy for Afghanistan.

5. PRT management and information systems that support representatives of DOS, USAID, and USDA need to be strengthened.

None of the civilian departments and agencies involved in the PRT had much on the ground experience supporting individual staff in remote and isolated locations. As a result, civilians on the PRT were often left to their own devices. While DOS, USAID, and USDA eventually put a PRT management team in place, all had difficulty fully integrating PRT programs into overall Embassy or Mission programs. Of note, the US Embassy in Kabul became aware of the need to improve and developed a new process for PRT reporting.

Many State and USAID PRT representatives indicated that they did not have reliable access to information about national projects in their province. Their inability to

[3] Although there were differing opinions about what type of military officer would be best suited to command a PRT, choices ranged from previous battalion commanders, alternate-command list officers, or senior civil affairs officers (at the rank of colonel).

provide comprehensive information about US activities to PRT and regional commanders undermined civilian credibility and limited their ability to integrate their activities with national programs.

Civilian PRT representatives proved to be one of the best sources of available information on political, economic, and social developments in Afghanistan's remote provinces. As the PRT concept matured and the center of effort shifted to the provinces, DOS and USAID began to draw on this information and put systems into place that helped with coordination between Kabul and the field. A recent report by USAID outlines a broad series of recommendations for management reform. However, more needs to be done. For example, an initiative to map all development activities has been underway for a considerable period, but the information is still not easily accessible to field staff.

6. The PRT access to funds and capabilities needs to be improved to support moving the center of effort to the provinces. USAID needs to re-compete the Quick Impact Project (QIP) funding mechanism in order to draw in implementing partners who are able to operate more effectively in unstable provinces.

The two implementing partners for USAID QIP programs had a mixed record of success. While USAID project approval could come in a matter of hours or days, project start-up and completion often dragged on for months, lagging far behind military projects. USAID's Quick Impact Program (QIP) implementing partners often seemed unwilling or unable to operate in insecure regions.

For example, in one insecure province, funding for fourteen schools was split between Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) and QIP resources. All schools projects were coordinated through local and national government and approved simultaneously. However, schools funded through CERP and implemented through local NGOs were constructed in a matter of three months while a similar number of USAID QIP school projects languished for over six months and were not projected to be finished until the following spring.

One central complaint was the lack of local community coordination. While some PRT projects were well coordinated with local leadership and government officials, others had poor community participation. In contrast, most NGOs strived to work with local communities to ensure buy-in and some level of financial or in-kind contribution. Lack of community participation in PRT projects had implications for both the sustainability of the project and for community willingness to contribute to parallel or follow-on NGO projects.

Learning from US and Coalition experiences in Iraq, the overall USG assistance effort could benefit from leveraging the experience and capability of international NGOs that have a record of working successfully in high-risk environments.

Additionally, implementation of the USAID Community Revitalization and Development Activity (CRDA) should be considered for Afghanistan. It is an effective model for community development that is currently being implemented in ten countries, including Iraq.

7. USDA representatives need access to dedicated funding. Additionally, any civilian agencies that place representatives on PRTs in the future should have access to dedicated funding.

Eighty-percent of the Afghan population depends on agriculture to earn a living. Any discussion about building support for the central government, minimizing support for the insurgency, and reducing the influence of the drug trade must therefore include a discussion about how to engage people in the agricultural sector.

In many cases, USDA representatives provided invaluable support to the PRT in advising on agricultural activities. But USDA had no legislative authority to provide funding to its representatives for these activities, and relied instead on persuasion to access CERP or QIP funds.

USAID Rural Agricultural Market Program (RAMP) made progress improving key agricultural areas of Afghanistan. Similarly, alternative livelihood programs in poppy growing areas made progress. However, few projects designed by USDA representatives were coordinated with RAMP, except Jalalabad. In fact, a significant proportion of USG civilians on the PRT complained that they knew little about RAMP projects and could not get the RAMP implementing partners to coordinate their efforts with the PRTs.

8. The USG needs to develop team training for all PRT personnel.

Many of the critical challenges faced by the PRT could have been addressed through synchronization of tours and tour lengths among all agencies, enabling adequate pre-deployment training. Instead, decisions about where to place military, USAID, and DOS representatives were often made after those representatives arrived in Afghanistan. In fact, several military personnel found they would be serving on a PRT, as opposed to a maneuver unit or staff headquarters, after they arrived in country. This stands in sharp contrast to ISAF, where some countries identify PRT members as much as a year in advance and have the members conduct significant training together.

Virtually everyone the team spoke with stated the PRT would have been more effective if assigned personnel had known their posting in advance. This would have allowed them to obtain language training, conduct research on local dynamics, and coordinate with the outgoing team.

Currently, deploying US units are developing unit sponsored training for PRT commanders and a course is being developed for PRT leadership at the National Defense University. The US military is also in the process of developing a 45-day PRT training program for future teams. These are important steps and they should be expanded and reinforced in the future. But there continues to be a serious lack of civilian trainers participating in pre-deployment programs for military units. In the past year, civilian representatives have been invited to several maneuver unit exercises, but their role and contribution has been short term and unclear.

Training should not only bring together military and civilian components, but should draw on the experience of people who have previously served in PRTs. All agencies should be fully briefed on PRT guidance and the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of different actors. Training should also include a frank discussion about the challenges PRTs have faced and the strengths and limitations of participating agencies.

B. Transition to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Authority

At the time this assessment was conducted, there were nine ISAF PRTs located in relatively stable areas in the north and west of the country. The Canadians, operating under the Coalition umbrella, led the only non-US PRT in the southern region. The Canadian PRT and the remainder of the PRTs in the southern region are scheduled for transition to ISAF from April through August 2006. It was anticipated that the US would continue to lead in the volatile eastern region along the Pakistan border.

The decision to transition from a US to an ISAF PRT is ultimately a political decision by NATO and lead nation volunteers based on the country's willingness to assume responsibility for a PRT. There are three critical issues to consider: 1) the security environment and the ability of ISAF PRTs to maintain stability in the face of lead nation restraints; 2) the availability of resources to continue reconstruction projects; and 3) whether systems are in place to ensure continuity in operations from the US to ISAF.

9. The USG, the GOA, and ISAF need a common political vision and strategy for PRTs.

NATO has established a common political vision and strategy for PRTs in ISAF's Operations Plan and other alliance documents. However, NATO has no authority over lead nation civilian efforts within the PRT. Without a common agreed upon political vision and strategy between NATO, lead nations and the GoA, individual PRT guidelines and execution tasks could be established independently by each lead nation. As noted earlier, the PRT is an important political-military tool for empowering local stakeholders, improving stability, and gaining popular support for the central

government of Afghanistan. US-led PRTs are key instruments in the counterinsurgency effort in the south and southeast provinces, which lends considerable support to stabilization of these areas.

It is thus imperative that all Afghan governmental stakeholders, NATO and PRT lead nation officials share a common sense of purpose as to the future direction of the PRTs. Each ISAF PRT needs to have the resources necessary to implement this common strategy and to achieve stabilization in its area of responsibility.

10. As ISAF/NATO members move into more volatile areas,* continuous examination of available combat power and reach-back capabilities must be conducted to compensate for changes in lead nation implementing restraints*.

Many ISAF PRTs have a more robust military and civilian presence than US PRTs. The Italian PRT in Herat and the German PRT at Konduz have significantly more soldiers and civilians than US-PRTs. However, ISAF PRTs often operate under "national restraints" that restrict the range of security-related measures that can be undertaken or constrain it from specific reconstruction activities. For example, national restraints initially limited the ability of some ISAF PRTs to conduct extended presence patrols, support GOA actions, or rapidly respond to local security incidents.

The inability to reinforce GOA operations and actions could lead to increased insurgent or tribal challenges to an expanding, but nascent national government authority..

Past decisions by ISAF members to assume command of a PRT in the north and west provinces was generally based on the assumption that the environment supported a security posture similar to that of a peacekeeping mission. As ISAF PRTs move into less secure regions, the risk of insurgent activity spilling into their area will increase and the ability of the PRT to adapt and ISAF to support rapid changes in force posture to support the PRTs become more important.

There has been significant consideration given by NATO and lead nations to meeting the challenges they face during transition. However, care should be given to ensuring there are processes to continuously review the changing nature of the volatile south and mechanisms to ensure that rapid response and reach-back capacity is available to respond to new dynamics.

11. Improved stability requires a combination of political, economic, and military efforts. As the list of participating countries in ISAF PRTs expands, NATO needs to ensure that each PRT is staffed and resourced to conduct essential tasks.

PRTs, either alone or in coordination with other actors in a province, must be able to address security, governance, and reconstruction needs based on the dynamics within their specific area. In permissive environments where NGOs have a significant presence, the PRT may not need to implement reconstruction projects focused on basic services or other key efforts that help stabilize the local area. However, as ISAF PRTs shift to the south and southeast where there are fewer NGOs operating, the PRT will need to have the capacity to assure implementation of reconstruction projects in their area or responsibility as a key element of their stabilization effort.

For example, the British PRT in Mazar e-Sharif focused primarily on security sector projects such as renovation of police stations, road infrastructure and municipal buildings to avoid overlap with the large NGO community in the area. However, in less permissive security environments where there are few, if any, NGOs, such a restricted focus would cut off one of the only sources of funding for reconstruction and development projects that are essential for stabilization. In these cases, improving the security sector alone would only help keep conflict in check for the short-term. It would not address the longer-term, underlying causes of instability.

A good example of lead nation efforts to address the full spectrum of efforts in the south is the development of a UK stabilization plan for Helmand. The UK deployed a strategy development team to Kandahar and Helmand in September and October 2005. The strategy team consisted of advisors with the following skill sets: conflict mitigation, local governance, economic development, police, justice, military and two planners from their Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU). This team in conjunction with UK Embassy personnel and US PRT expertise in Helmand developed a broad strategy to stabilize the province. The UK Embassy used the strategy to develop operational programs and a personnel assignment plan that places the appropriate civilians with the right skill sets to manage civilian projects at the Helmand PRT while the military works to improve the security environment.

12. As more PRTs transition to ISAF control, the US should ensure that a minimum level of staff and US funding remains in place to enable continuity of operations and a smooth transition.

Continuity of operations is critical to maintaining credibility with the local populace. A key element of transition is the handover and transfer of authority between incoming and outgoing teams. Several of previous successful handovers have included leaving US military personnel with the new team for a short time. Unfortunately, this was done on a limited, volunteer basis.

For example, while the Canadians had a robust force protection element in Kandahar, their priority was security sector reform rather than small reconstruction projects. Canada believed reconstruction was more appropriately carried out by other agencies, with the appropriate environment facilitated by the PRT's work. Although money would become available through the Canadian International

Development Agency (CIDA), Canada required time to establish its local project funding and management process. During the assessment it was not clear how much funding would be available for reconstruction within the security sector reform programs.

The Canadian PRT was promised US CERP funding during the transition of the PRT to facilitate their transition. However, rather than continuing to develop new activities, a US caretaker staff was mandated to close out as many projects as possible for accounting reasons. Incoming Canadian PRT members indicated that Afghans noticed the drop in activity. There was concern that the Afghans would interpret this drop in support as a sign of weakness or lack of equal commitment by the Canadians, which could increased instability.

Continuity of situational awareness within the PRT area of operations is also critical. The incoming team needs access to information on political and security dynamics, full details on key personalities, and projects database. Where possible, classified information should be released to Coalition and NATO members. For example, the Canadian PRT funded a local organization to conduct a mapping of tribal groups. A US PRT funded the same organization to do a similar project in another region. Neither the US nor the Canadians were briefed on each other's operations and were unable to share the information with each other.

Currently no Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) exists between the USG and ISAF nations assuming leadership of US-led PRTs. The US Embassy is beginning to negotiate force protection and logistics support for those US civilian staff left with ISAF lead nations PRTs. But there remains a critical need for a common understanding between the USG and ISAF members about the appropriate role for US PRTs members and ISAF PRT responsibilities towards those members. As the US passes the baton to ISAF, having protocols in place will ease the transfer.

C. Extending the PRT Concept to other Peace and Stability Operations

The PRT model may help stabilize other post-conflict environments. An initiative based on the PRT concept has been instituted in Iraq, and there is interest in exploring its use in other post-conflict environments. PRTs are seen by many as a useful structure to coordinate military and civilian efforts in building stable, desirable governments.

In addition to the above recommendations, three key issues must be considered in determining how elements of the PRT model can be applied to other stability operations: 1) the level of violence in which the PRT is introduced; 2) the type of violence; and 3) the tailoring of PRT skill sets and resources to USG policy objectives for the specific operation.

13. PRTs, as currently structured, are most effective where instability precludes heavy NGO involvement, but where violence is not so acute that combat operations predominate. If PRTs will be used outside this range, the model needs adaptation.

In very permissive environments where NGOs are implementing a broad range of development activities, PRTs are less essential to reconstruction progress. For example, current ISAF PRTs have in many cases been able to adopt an approach that limits their military focus to security sector issues. They also operate in a manner that minimizes duplication of NGO efforts. There may also be areas in another country context where NGOs have an established presence, and adding PRT reconstruction activities to the mix could complicate overarching international reconstruction efforts.

In areas of active insurgency it has proven difficult for civilians to operate effectively outside the auspices of the PRT. Furthermore, in highly volatile areas it may make sense to embed civilian elements with maneuver units where leaders have more force protection assets. However, increased reconstruction within active combat zones increases requirements for security forces to protect new symbols of change and success.

14. Security measures need to be periodically reviewed and adapted to changing conditions and challenges.

A “one size fits all” approach to force protection in significantly different security environments reduced the ability of PRTs to effectively use other tools available to it. All PRT staff members interviewed understood that their job entailed a level of risk. They also were acutely aware that force protection requirements could limit their effectiveness and ability to interact with the local population.

Force protection requirements ought to be eased in more permissive areas and as the threat diminishes. Typically the ability to rapidly adjust force protection to the current challenge means that decisions regarding force protection should devolve to the lowest level.

15. If PRTs are replicated in other countries, their initial focus should be on mapping causes of conflict and developing targeted programs in order to understand and respond to conditions underlying instability.

The key advantage of PRTs is that they are positioned to do what no other actor can do in remote and insecure districts. They can bring a combination of military and civilian resources to bear on local causes of violence. They can support the development of viable governance and security sector institutions and they can strengthen the hand of groups who have an interest in stability.

While some PRTs did commendable jobs at defining and addressing these dynamics, the PRTs were not always equipped with the right skill sets to rapidly identify and address the causes of conflict.

Most PRT members explicitly acknowledged that it was difficult to disentangle violence perpetrated by anti-coalition militia from violence driven by other factors—tribal competition over natural resources, violence linked to poppy cultivation and opium production, or fighting between local military commanders over control of transit routes. Even when the original causes of violence were not directly a result of the anti-coalition militia, generalized instability and lack of governance in remote districts made it easier for this activity to take root and flourish.

Personnel assigned to a PRT needed to work to identify and address the issues underlying regional violence. This included identifying and engaging at-risk populations such as unemployed youth, those living on the edges of the formal economy, and those groups who supported the Taliban, either because of coercion or because of the services the Taliban provided.

As an example, in southern Afghanistan more than one-third of the violence was attributed to tribal conflict. PRT staffs were not always well suited for this mission and lacked reach-back capability to deal with tribal conflict. Not directly dealing with this specific source of conflict jeopardized overall mission success.

This lesson can extend to other countries. For example, if the PRT model was implemented in Haiti where violence is heavily shaped by youth gangs, staff on the PRT would need to place a heavier focus on youth activities, anti-gang initiatives, and community policing.

16. PRT assets and funding must be tailored to meet specific requirements of different cultural factors and security conditions. Those assigned to the PRTs need specialized sets of skills, skills not always held by many military and civilian officers.

As one respondent lamented, “the PRT is a place, not a concept.” USG PRTs have achieved a degree of stability and refined their strategy to meet the changing dynamics of their area of responsibility. However, PRTs have not always been resourced to meet the changing nature of their efforts. Individuals possessing the appropriate skill sets for emerging challenges have frequently not been deployed nor provided through temporary reach-back mechanisms.

Individuals assigned to PRTs should be capable of making key assessments, refining analysis, and implementing response activities. Initially, desired skill sets of personnel assigned should be focused on short-term stabilization and conflict mitigation. Subsequent staffing may well focus on development of basic

infrastructure for security sector reform and then on improvements in local governance. Thus, the skill sets of the PRT personnel change as the nature of their efforts and challenges change.

PRT support and personnel mechanisms have to be developed to expedite deployment of appropriate skill sets or linkages to ongoing national programs that can be melded into specific PRT dynamics.

V. Conclusion

PRTs have become an effective tool for stabilization in Afghanistan. In many places, they have strengthened the hand of groups who support the central government and they have helped create an environment where political, social, and economic development is possible. However, three years into implementation and with transitions to ISAF accelerating, the application of lessons learned is appropriate and vital. The recommendations in this assessment address how PRTs can be more effective in Afghanistan.

However, the PRT concept is at a transition point. Provincial Reconstruction Teams – if lessons are applied and the model appropriately adapted – offer an effective tool for stabilization and application of regional reconstruction tied to USG national programs and efforts. The degree to which PRTs may be effective in other venues will largely depend on commitment of resources in conjunction with the security environment and political realities. To maximize the future application of the PRT concept, however, interagency doctrine development is essential.

VI. Issues For Future Study

During the course of the fieldwork and preparation of the report, several additional areas for further review were identified. Researchers may wish to consider delving into one or more of the following activities:

- Analyze long-term impact on the lives of Afghan civilians in PRT areas of operation;
- Assess ways to better integrate and interface with NGOs;
- Identify the necessary and sufficient criteria for the transition from military/civilian interventions to traditional development programming.
- Review potential measures of effectiveness for PRT objectives.

Appendix A: Questionnaire

1. Determine key lessons from PRT experience to date to inform the transition policy as PRTs are handed off to NATO.
   - Are there specific local political and security conditions that need to be met prior to transition?
   - What continuity issues should be considered in turnover of Coalition PRTs to ISAF/NATO (political/security/development/funding)?
   - Are there specific aspects of Coalition PRTs that must be replicated by ISAF/NATO PRTs to ensure continued success? What key functions need to be sustained?
   - What issues should be considered related to security?

2. Generate lessons to inform greater cooperation and coordination between military and civilians in conflict and post-conflict settings.
   - How are military and civilian actors currently coordinating to achieve PRT goals? How are roles and responsibilities defined?
   - In what other ways and in what other areas could they coordinate?
   - In the following areas, what coordination lessons can be learned from the PRT experience? 1) Humanitarian and development assistance; 2) Security sector; 3) Strategic communications/public diplomacy

3. Analyze aspects of the PRT concept and various implementation approaches to determine their applicability to other contexts.
   - What elements of the Afghan context (i.e. security situation, political dynamics, geography, etc) made PRTs necessary?
   - How does the PRT concept relate to USG goals and international mandate for S&R in Afghanistan?
   - What role have the PRTs played as a platform for the decentralized implementation of key elements of the overall national strategy (DDR, Policing, Counter-Narcotics) for Afghanistan?
   - Could the PRT model or aspects of the PRT model be applied to other settings?
   - What conditions (security, significant military presence, geography, and political dynamics) make the PRT model the most appropriate model for other contexts?
   - If not the PRT approach, what other options exist?

Appendix B: Interview List

--Alexander, Deborah, PhD. Afghan Reconstruction Group, U.S. Embassy Kabul
--Anderson, Worth, EUR/RPM, NATO-Afghanistan Desk Officer
--Azua, Felipe, SFC, PRT Ghazni, NCOIC
--Bowers, Michael. Mercy Corps Country Director
--Bowes, Steve, LTC. Kandahar Canadian PRT Commander
--Bradley, William. USAID Panshir PRT Representative
--Britton, Jon, Col. UK Mazar-e-Sharif PRT Commander
--Callan, Mike. Canadian CIDA at Kandahar
--Campos, Joaquin CPT, S-5, TF Alamo, 3-141 IN, FOB Ghazni
--Carroll, Joseph, USDA Country Representative
--Carland, Raphael. Former DOS PRT Representative, Farah
--Cohen, Lawrence. DOS PRT Representative, Herat
--Cooper, Laura. OSD/SOLIC
--Cosgrave, Jay. USAID PRT Representative Farah
--Creighton, Jackie. UK/DFID Deputy Head
--Crevello, Stacy. USDA PRT Representative Bamiyan
--Crombie, Susan. UK/FCO Mazar e-Sharif PRT Representative
--Croon, Joe, Col. Assistant PMI (Power), CFC-A
--Dal Bello, Christine. DOS/INL
--Daniels, Tom. DOS PRT Representative, Kunduz
--Donahue, Pat, Col. Commanding Officer, Coalition Regional Command/East, Salerno, Khost Province
--Dube, Chris, Captain. PRT Ghazni Civil Affairs Team
--Fontes, Robin, LTC. Tirin Kowt (Uruzgan and Daykundi) PRT Commander
--Fry, Maureen, Major. PRT Ghazni Civil Affairs Team
--Fulgham, Alonzo. USAID Director U.S. Embassy Kabul
--Gary, Phil. USAID Chief of Staff/Kabul
--Garrasi, Danata. UK/DFID Mazar I Sharif PRT Representative
--Girard, Michelle. USAID Regional Development Officer, Advisor, CJTF-76, Bagram, Air Field
--Gnesdiloff, Kira. USAID PRT Field Representative/Bamiyan
--Gonzales, Leslie. USAID Acting Regional Development Advisor, RC East and Sharan (Paktika) PRT Representative
--Gonzales, Otto. USDA PRT Coordinator, U.S. Embassy Kabul
--Granfield, Linda, Major. Jalalabad PRT Commander
--Green, Dan. DOS Tirin Kowi (Uruzgan and Daykundi) PRT Representative
--Green, Kerry. USAID Tirin Kowi (Uruzgan and Daykundi) PRT Representative
--Groen, Sara. DOS PRT Representative, Ghazni
--Gudridge, Lindsay, Col. CENTCOM Civil Affairs
--Gutierrez, Frank, LTC. PRT Commanding Officer Mehtariam (Laghman)
--Hamel, fnu, Col. CFC-A, PMI and CJ-9
--Hall, Will. USAID PRT Representative Asadabad and Gardez
--Harney, John LTC (P), CJ9, CJTF 76

--Hennings, Ken. USAID Representative ISAF Western Regional Area Coordinator, Herat
--Hert, Robert, Cpl. Royal Mounted Police
--Hogberg, James, LTC. Lashkar Gah PRT Commander
--Hushek, Tom. DOS Herat PRT Representative
--Ingram, Harold. DOS PRT Representative Asadabad
--Irish, Pat. USAID Lashkar Gah PRT Representative
--Johnson, Richard. USDA PRT Program Manager
--Johnson, Thomas. USAID Program Officer, U.S. Embassy Kabul
--Kamiya, Jason, Major General. CG Combined Joint Task Force 76
--Keating, Tim Col. PRT Commander Bamiyan
--Kemp, Robert. DOS Representative to the Coalition Regional Command/East, Salerno
--King, S.F. Major. Kandahar Canadian PRT
--Kite, Eric. USAID Director, Democracy Programs, U.S. Embassy Kabul
--Klaits, Alex. USAID PRT Representative Faizabad
--Knowles, Jeff. USDA Representative to the Ghazni PRT
--Labrador, David. IOM QIP/PRT Program Support Officer
--Langenkamp, Dan. Former DOS Representative to Jalalabad PRT
--Leverson, Mark. Former USAID Field Program Officer in Kunduz
--Libront, Linda. First Secretary, Embassy of Canada/Kabul
--Linares, Pedro Major. CJ9 SO OPS, ISAF
--Loyd, Paula. USAID Qalat (Zabul) PRT Representative
--Maggi, Turk. DOS Political Advisor, CJTF-76 Bagram, Air Field
--Maile, Haji, Sani. MRRD Director, Ghazni Province
--Mann, Andrew, Deputy DoS PRT Coordinator, U.S. Embassy Kabul
--Marinacci, Nick. USAID PRT Manager/Kabul
--Marsh, Adrian. Deputy Director, IRC, U.S. Embassy Kabul
--Mazerik, Andy, LTC. Kandahar PRT – S 5
--McGuire, Tim, LTC. Commander, TF Fury, 173rd Airborne Inf, Paktika Province
--McArdle, Patricia, DOS PRT Representative, Mazar e-Sharif
--McNaught, James, Former DOS PRT Representative, Gardez
--Meier, Robert, LTC. Commander, Ghazni PRT
--Meier, Don. Regional Coordinator, Chemonics International/USAID RAMP program
--Merkel, Al. USAID Former Regional PRT Coordinator and PRT Rep in Heart
--Metrinko, Mike. DOS PRT Representative Chagcharan (Ghowr)
--Moentmann, James, Col. Chief of Staff, CFC-A, Camp Eggers, Kabul
--Mongan, John, Former DOS PRT Representative, Ghazni
--Munster, Pete LTC. PRT Commander Asadabad
--Mushtaq, Fatima, Education Director, Ghazni Province.
--Neumann, Ronald, Ambassador, Kabul
--Neilson, Rebecca Col. Deputy Commander 321st Civil Affairs Brigade
--Nichols, James, Former USAID PRT Representative, Gardez
--Norland, Richard, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Kabul
--O'Doherty, David, LTC. Parwan (Parwan, Panshir, Kapisa) PRT Commanding Officer

--Obermuller, Gordan, LTC. Sharan (Paktika) PRT Commanding Officer
--Otterstad, Kevin, PFC, CAT Team, PRT Ghazni
--Owens, James Col, Commander 321st Civil Affairs Brigade
--Owens, Kevin, Col. Commander Coalition Regional Command/South, Kandahar
--Palmer, Niki, Advisor State Building Team, UK/DFID
--Parker, Michelle. USAID Jalalabad and Mehtariam (Laghman) PRT Representative
--Patton, John. USAID RC South Regional Development Advisor and former Kandahar PRT Representative
--Pfieffer, John, S/Sgt, PRT Ghazni, CAT-A
--Pease, Kim. USAID PRT Representative Chageharan (Ghowr) and Herat
--Praster, Tom. DOS PRT Coordinator, U.S. Embassy Kabul
--Provincial Governors: a. Hakim Taniwal, Paktia Province, b. Haji Sher Alam, Ghazni Provincial Governor
--Qayum, M. Salim, Engineer. Director of Program Management, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
--Ramkissoon, Gerald. USDA Representative to Coalition Regional Command/South, Kandahar
--Richie, Robert, Captain. Kandahar Canadian PRT
--Rosenblum, David, Major. GARDEZ PRT
--Ruf, James, LTC. Former Commander, PRT Jalalabad
--Salinas, Orlando, LTC, CO TF Alamo, 3/141 Inf Texas National Guard, FOB Ghazni
--Sammon, Bob. USAID Gardez Representative
--Santa-Pinter, Andy LTC. PRT Commander Farah
--Schweiger, John. Deputy USAID PRT Manager
--Sedeki, Ahmed. Ministry of Interior, GOA
--Seidl, Mike. USIP – Former Ops Officer for Civilian Command
--Sias, David LTC, Deputy CJ9, CJTF 76
--Simmons, Angus, Counsellor for Political Affairs, U.S. Embassy/Kabul
--Simonds, Miriam. USAID Mazar e-Sharif PRT Representative
--Skerry, Christa. Former USAID/Office of Transitions Initiatives Rep for PRTs
--Skrade, Douglas. USDA Lashkar Gah PRT Representative
--Stapleton, Barbara, Advocacy and Policy Coordinator, ACBAR (Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief), Kabul
--Soltwedel, Norbert. USDA Representative to the Coalition Regional Command/East, Salerno
--Stevens, Nancy COL. Assistant PMI (Agriculture) CFC-A
--Tarver, Aaron. DOS PRT Representative Bamiyan
--Timmons, Tim. DOS Gardez PRT Representative
--Thompson, Trent. USAID Jalalabad and Mehtariam (Laghman) Representative
--Vasquez, Orestes. USDA Jalalabad Representative
--Walker, Stephen, Col. CFC-A, Political Military Integration
--Wankel, Doug. Office of the Drug Coordinator, U.S. Embassy Kabul
--Warren, Glen. DOS PRT Representative, Mehtarlam
--Wasley, LIAM. DOS PRT Representative, Jalalabad
--White, George. Former DOS PRT Coordinator, U.S. Embassy Kabul
--Williams, Sharon. USDA Representative to Parwan/Panshir and Kapisia PRTs

--Wilcox, Andrew, LTC. Qalat (Zabul) PRT Commanding Officer
--Wintermeyer, Charles. DOS Qalat (Zabul) PRT Representative
--Winstead, Mike, Col. Col. OSC-A
--Wise, David. DOS PRT Representative, Lashkar Gah
--Wood, Alan. USDA Representative to Coalition Regional Command/South (Kandahar)
--Zweifel, David, Ambassador. DOS/Office of the Inspector General/Washington

Appendix C: Organizational Diagram



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